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Viewing cable 09STATE36825, S) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON SHIPMENT OF UAVS

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Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#09STATE36825**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
09STATE36825	2009-04-14 21:17	2011-08-30 01:44	SECRET	Secretary of State

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.semana.com/mundo/wikileaks-venezuela-misterioso-vinculo-entre-caracas-teheran/158978-3.aspx>

VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #6825 1042136
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 142117Z APR 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0000
INFO RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0000
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0000

S E C R E T STATE 036825

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2019
TAGS: [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [MASS](#) [ETTC](#) [TU](#) [VE](#) [IR](#)
SUBJECT: (S) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON SHIPMENT OF UAVS
FROM IRAN TO VENEZUELA

REF: A. ANKARA 3
[IB](#). ANKARA 126
[IC](#). STATE 28302
[ID](#). ANKARA 450

Classified By: EUR/PRA Acting Director Kathleen Morenski,

Reason 1.4 (b), (c) and (d)

BACKGROUND

¶11. (S//NF) On March 25, we alerted Turkey to Iranian plans to ship unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Venezuela (ref C). The GOT expressed appreciation for the information and promised to share it with select officials in other agencies at a previously-scheduled GOT interagency export control taskforce meeting taking place later that same day (red D). The GOT had already warned Iran about a previous shipment from January bound for Venezuela (ref b) "at the highest levels" and specifically cautioned Iran against shipping proscribed materiel through Turkey. Turkish officials agreed to take the necessary action to prevent this shipment and requested additional information about the timing and possible companies involved in order to help the GOT prevent the shipment.

¶12. (S//NF) The U.S. now has additional information to share with Turkey. Specifically, Venezuelan officials were continuing preparations to transfer the Mohajer-2 UAVs and related equipment. In addition, while the dismantled UAVs and associated components were intended to be transported through Turkey, the Venezuelans also were considering alternative routes should a transfer via Turkey prove too risky. The U.S. believes this shipment constitutes arms and related materiel, which Iran is prohibited from transferring pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1747, paragraph 5. While UAVs are not directly included in the UN Register of Conventional Arms, they are included in the Wassenaar Arrangement's list of arms (Section 4.2), which Turkey is a member of.

ACTION REQUEST

¶13. (S) Department requests post approach appropriate-level Turkish officials and deliver the talking points in paragraph 4 and report response. (Talking points may also be left as a non-paper). If the cargo is found to be in violation of UNSCR 1747, post should urge the GOT to use all available means to prevent the transshipment of this cargo by detaining it.

OBJECTIVES

¶14. (S) Post should seek to achieve the following:

-- Provide Turkish officials with additional information regarding Iran's attempt to ship unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and related material to Venezuela via Turkey;

-- Emphasize to Turkish officials that UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1747, operative paragraph 5, prohibits Iran from transferring any arms or related materiel;

-- Emphasize that these goods are produced by an Iranian entity listed in the Annex to UNSCR 1747.

-- Thank the GOT for its willingness to interdict and take positive action with regards to this and a separate shipment in January. As a NATO Ally, we try to provide Turkey with as much information as possible on these issues, which could help lead them to take action in detaining shipments; and

-- Emphasize that, should we receive additional information regarding this shipment, we will provide it as expeditiously as possible.

TALKING POINTS/NON-PAPER

15. (S//REL Turkey) Begin talking points/non-paper:

--We would like to thank you for your willingness to take the necessary action to prevent a shipment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) from Iran to Venezuela.

-- We would now like to share some additional information with you to ensure that Iran does not make use of your territory to transfer items proscribed by UN Security Council resolutions 1737, 1747, and 1803.

-- Venezuelan officials were continuing to prepare for the transfer of Iranian Mohajer-2 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and related equipment from Iran prior to May.

-- Though the primary transport route for the dismantled UAVs and associated components continued to include Turkey, the Venezuelans were also considering alternative routes should transfer via Turkey prove too risky.

-- We believe these reconnaissance UAVs and the related items, produced by the UN-designated Qods Aviation (or Aeronautics) Industries, will be used by the Venezuelan military and constitute arms and related materiel captured under UNSCR 1747 and subject to the asset freeze called for in UNSCR 1737, "if owned or controlled by Qods Aviation."

-- UN Security Council Resolution 1747, operative paragraph 5, prohibits Iran from supplying, selling or transferring any arms or related materiel. It also requires all states to prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not such transfers originated in the territory of Iran.

-- We deeply appreciate the Government of Turkey's continued cooperation, support and willingness to enact prompt and thorough efforts in promoting interdictions designed to prevent the transfer of sensitive materials by Iran.
END POINTS.

REPORTING REQUIREMENT

16. (U) Post is instructed to report results of its efforts as soon as possible.

POINTS OF CONTACT

17. (U) Washington points of contact for follow-up are and Margaret Mitchell, ISN/CATR and Matt Hardiman, EUR/PRA.

18. (U) Department thanks post for its assistance. Please slug all responses for ISN, EUR, NEA, IO, WHA, and T.
CLINTON